Abuse of Dominance in Digital Platforms: An Analysis of Indian Competition Jurisprudence


Tilottama Raychaudhuri


An ongoing debate in competition jurisprudence today is with respect to the enforcement of competition law in digital markets. Digital markets are newer markets in context of which traditional tools of competition law have to be understood and applied. Though the challenges of competition enforcement in digital markets are manifold, this paper focusses on the assessment of dominance and abuse in platform markets, particularly in light of the 2019 Supreme Court judgement in the Uber matter. The Supreme Court’s opinion that loss-making pricing can be an indicator of dominance is inconsistent with the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) views, which had cautioned against this circular interpretation of dominance and put the issue to rest. The author submits that conflicting interpretations such as these erode the certainty of the law. Competition laws can be flexible but not uncertain or unpredictable. The author identifies areas of concern in digital platforms that are yet unresolved and need to be addressed urgently by guidelines/amendments before the law on this issue becomes incoherent.


How to Cite
Raychaudhuri, T. (2020). Abuse of Dominance in Digital Platforms: An Analysis of Indian Competition Jurisprudence. Competition Commission of India Journal on Competition Law and Policy, 1, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.5


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