CCI’s Jurisdictional Conflict with the Proposed Cement Industry Regulator: An Analysis

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Pariekh Pandey

Abstract

Controversial activities by manufacturers in the Indian cement industry have repeatedly invited investigations by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for allegations of anti-competitive cartelising agreements. These manufacturing firms have created an artificial scarcity of production and supply in the market, using their association meetings as a front for illegal collusive activities. In spite of CCI having penalised the firms for their activities, the continued cartelisation in the cement market has led the Indian government to propose the establishment of a cement and steel industry regulator for proper governance. Along these lines, this paper aims to achieve a middle ground for removing conflict and ensuring cooperation between CCI and the proposed regulator. The author takes the initiative to study the nature of the cartelising activities of Indian cement manufacturers and the action taken by CCI through analysing the stance of the Supreme Court on the primacy of institutions in competition law matters relating to the cement industry. The paper additionally discusses competition enforcement against cement cartels in China and South Africa—two developing nations competing with the growing Indian economy and facing the same issues of deep-rooted cartelisation in the cement industry.

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How to Cite
Pandey, P. (2023). CCI’s Jurisdictional Conflict with the Proposed Cement Industry Regulator: An Analysis. Competition Commission of India Journal on Competition Law and Policy, 3, 113–136. https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v3.88

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