Antitrust Routine in Delineating the Frontier of SEP and FRAND-Encumbered Patents: A Comparative Study

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Published Oct 10, 2023
https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v4.97
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CCIJOCLP, Vol. 4, No. 1 [2023]

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Arindam Basu
Assistant Professor, Rajiv Gandhi School of Intellectual Property Law, IIT Kharagpur - 721302
Anshuman Sahoo
Doctoral Candidate, Rajiv Gandhi School of Intellectual Property Law, IIT Kharagpur - 721302

Abstract

Standards-Essential Patents (SEPs), and Fair, Reasonable, And Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) licensing commitments by the SEP holders, play a crucial role in enabling cooperation amid the cut-throat competition of innovation markets. Unsurprisingly, FRAND and SEPs have been the subject of frequent antitrust scrutiny across jurisdictions in recent years. However, in a post-COVID era, markets crippled by the pandemic will desperately need regulatory relaxations across the globe. Significant shifts in policy approaches may be necessary for certain situations to encourage innovation and instil stability. Against such a backdrop, we explore the emerging trends in the SEP-antitrust intersection across the US and the EU and try to understand the policy approaches these jurisdictions are adopting by analysing the recent judicial and legislative trends in addressing the issue of antitrust intervention in FRAND-encumbered patents. We then explore the Indian jurisdiction and discuss in detail the problems and prospects of FRAND licensing in India.

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How to Cite
Basu, A., & Sahoo, A. (2023). Antitrust Routine in Delineating the Frontier of SEP and FRAND-Encumbered Patents: A Comparative Study. Competition Commission of India Journal on Competition Law and Policy, 4(1), 41–76. https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v4.97
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