Regulating Combinations in Platform Markets: An Indian Perspective


Ankit Srivastava
Abhyuday Yadav


Data has emerged as the most important economic asset in the digital economy. Firms in the digital era have been inclined to collect as much data as possible, which can then be used to make strategic business decisions to gain competitive significance over other market players. Data is the new oil in the global economy, and the big fish are eating up small ones to remain dominant in the market. The giant players are going for numerous mergers and acquisitions, with a special focus on small, emerging players in the market, and often, due to the requirement of a threshold for investigation, the combination goes unnoticed. The point of discussion is also whether we need a separate legislation to tackle these markets. This research focuses on the role of data, the big players and their merger patterns, and the enforcement gap in merger control regimes in global digital markets, where data plays a primary role. This research examines the intricacies of digital markets and the challenges they pose before competition authorities. While discussing the challenges, the authors have emphasised the parameters of jurisdictional threshold incorporated in competition regimes in varied jurisdictions. The research tries to propose a separate regime for digital market combinations.


How to Cite
Srivastava, A., & Yadav, A. (2023). Regulating Combinations in Platform Markets: An Indian Perspective. Competition Commission of India Journal on Competition Law and Policy, 3, 21–53.


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